Post-quantum Signed Receipts for AI Tool Calls

Updated

Asqav is the unaffiliated third-party notary for AI tool call receipts. The signer that produces a receipt is operated by Asqav, not by the agent vendor and not by the regulated entity. The receipt format is published on the IETF Datatracker, so any auditor can verify a customer's evidence pack against the public verify key.

Post-quantum signatures with ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) are one of the signer options Asqav exposes. They are available to customers whose retention windows reach into the quantum-threat horizon.

What it is: an Asqav-signed receipt, with ML-DSA-65 as one of the signer's algorithm options.

What it proves: the receipt verifies against a public key for the full retention window, past the point where a quantum computer breaks classical signatures.

Who signs it: Asqav, an unaffiliated third party, never the agent vendor and never the regulated entity.

Why the unaffiliated signer matters

Regulated buyers ask for a receipt that a party other than the regulated entity can verify. A receipt signed by the same workload being audited does not pass that test. Three rules bear on the unaffiliated-party property, and SEC 17a-4(f)(3)(v) writes it directly into the rule text:

Deployment topology

The signer holds the keys. The agent never touches the signing key. To audit, the reader fetches the public verify key from a documented endpoint, takes the customer's audit pack, and verifies every signature offline without an Asqav account.

The signer is the Asqav-hosted SaaS signer at https://api.asqav.com. Asqav holds the keys. The customer holds none.

Its receipts use one wire format, verify against keys exposed at GET /.well-known/jwks.json, and are documented against the IETF receipt format.

Signer options

The signer accepts the algorithm choice as configuration. Two options are documented today:

AlgorithmWhen to choose itWhere it runs
ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204)Retention windows that reach the quantum-threat horizon.The Asqav-hosted signer.
Ed25519Retention windows under the post-quantum migration horizon, where the evaluator does not require PQC alignment.The same signer surfaces, selected per deployment.

The algorithm identifier rides inside the signed envelope ("alg": "ML-DSA-65"), so an auditor reads which scheme protects each receipt without trusting transport metadata.

What ML-DSA-65 buys

ML-DSA is the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm. It derives from CRYSTALS-Dilithium and was standardized in NIST FIPS 204 in August 2024.

ML-DSA-65 is the Category 3 parameter set. It targets roughly 192 bits of classical security and resistance against an adversary with a fault-tolerant quantum computer. The full standard is published by NIST at csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final.

The algorithm choice follows the retention window. A receipt signed in 2026 needs to verify against the public key for the full window the regulator applies:

For receipts whose retention window crosses into the quantum-threat horizon, the algorithm choice is part of the third-party-notary contract. ML-DSA-65 has no known polynomial-time quantum attack against the underlying module-LWE and module-SIS problems.

Where the receipt format is published

The receipt envelope, signature encoding, decision vocabulary and capture topology values are published in an IETF Internet-Draft on the Datatracker:

datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts/

The draft documents the canonical hash, the signature scheme identifier, the timestamp format and the verification algorithm. Any independent implementation can parse and verify an Asqav receipt without an Asqav account.

Producing a signed receipt

The Python SDK takes a single call. The algorithm is server-side configuration. The SDK does not pick it:

python
import asqav

asqav.init()

agent = asqav.Agent.create("invoice-bot")

receipt = agent.sign(
    "filesystem:write",
    {"path": "/exports/q1-invoices.csv", "bytes": 18324},
)

print(receipt.signature_envelope)
# {
#   "alg": "ML-DSA-65",
#   "signed_at": "2026-05-25T14:02:11Z",
#   "signature": "...",
#   "verify_key_id": "vk_...",
#   "previous_receipt_hash": "..."
# }

The envelope carries the algorithm identifier, the signer-issued timestamp, the signature bytes, the verify key identifier so a verifier can fetch the right key from /.well-known/jwks.json, and the previous receipt hash so the chain-of-custody is enforceable.

Verifying a receipt offline

The receipt format is on the IETF Datatracker and the verify key is on a public endpoint, so an auditor never needs an Asqav account:

bash
curl https://api.asqav.com/.well-known/jwks.json > jwks.json
python verify_receipt.py --receipt receipt.json --jwks jwks.json --offline

The verifier reads the key from the saved key set and checks the signature against the algorithm named in the envelope. Add --predecessor previous.json to check the hash-chain link to the receipt before it. Offline and Air-Gapped Verification covers receipts taken from an audit pack.

Further reading

References