Out-of-process Signing
Updated
Asqav is the unaffiliated third-party notary for AI tool call receipts. The signer runs in a trust boundary the agent does not own and holds keys the agent never touches. An external auditor verifies its receipts offline against the public verify key. This page documents the out-of-process deployment topology: the signer is the Asqav-hosted notary signer, a service in Asqav's cloud and outside every agent that calls it.
The unaffiliated-third-party position has a regulatory shape:
- SEC 17a-4(f) gives broker-dealers two ways to execute the required undertakings (2022 amendments, Release No. 34-96034): a designated third party unaffiliated with the broker-dealer, or an internal designated executive officer. Asqav fits the unaffiliated-third-party route, which co-located keys inside the audited workload cannot.
- NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.06 calls for audit trail systems designed to reconstruct material financial transactions sufficient to support normal operations and obligations of the covered entity.
- DORA Articles 28 to 30 have financial entities evidence ICT third-party risk management and retain attestable evidence of those controls.
The signer running outside the agent process is what gives the resulting receipts verifiable evidentiary weight against these provisions. Asqav does not make legal admissibility claims; whether a receipt meets a given evidentiary standard is for the customer and its legal counsel to determine.
The threat the boundary closes
Threat model
An attacker who compromises the agent process, through prompt injection that achieves code execution, a poisoned tool dependency, or a memory-safety bug in a model runtime, gains arbitrary code execution inside the agent. With in-process signing, that attacker can:
- read the signing key out of process memory
- mint forged receipts that look indistinguishable from genuine ones
- backdate or alter the hash chain to hide their actions
With out-of-process signing, the attacker has process-level access to the agent but no read access to the signer's keys. The signer accepts request payloads, validates them and returns signed envelopes. The signer never returns the private key. A compromised agent can request signatures on attacker-chosen payloads, but it cannot retroactively rewrite the chain. The signer's local audit log captures every request the agent made.
Why this matters for compliance
Regulators and assessors expect the key custody question to have a clean answer, and that expectation comes from how the reviews run rather than from any clause naming a hardware security module. Take four of them:
- a HIPAA risk analysis under 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A), an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of electronic protected health information, which puts the workload handling PHI inside its scope
- a NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.06 review of audit trail systems designed to reconstruct material financial transactions, where an audit trail is worth what the key that signed it is worth
- a SOC 2 Type II engagement over the entity's own key management control
- a DORA Article 28 ICT third-party-risk review.
Every one of those reviewers lands on the same question: where does the signing key live, and who can read it. Keys held in a hardware security module or a separate trust boundary keep that answer short, and the out-of-process signer is the architecture behind that answer.
What a compromised agent can still do
A precise threat model names the residual, not only the win. With Asqav, the agent process holds an API key and nothing else. The signing key and the receipt ledger live outside the agent, and they also live outside the agent operator's infrastructure.
What an attacker holding that API key cannot do:
- Read the signing key. It stays server-side, and on Enterprise in an Asqav-managed cloud KMS where the secret never enters Asqav's database.
- Rewrite or delete an issued receipt. Receipts persist under per-agent and per-organization hash chains, and the agent-facing API exposes no call that removes one. The single erasure call, a GDPR Article 17 payload erasure, nulls the stored payload alone; the digest and the signature stay valid, and the erasure writes its own audit entry.
- Backdate a record. Signing time is stamped server-side and anchored to external timestamp authorities.
What that attacker can still do:
- Request signatures over content it chose. This residual holds for any signer that sits outside the agent, whatever its shape: a signature proves who recorded what and when, not that the reporting process told the truth. Asqav narrows the residual instead of hiding it. Each receipt can declare its capture path (see Capture topology), so a verifier can tell a self-reported receipt from one captured by a network proxy or an eBPF probe at a boundary the agent does not control. Output binding through
result_digest, counterparty acknowledgments, and a WebAuthn user co-signature each tie a receipt to evidence the agent cannot produce alone. - Stay silent. A receipt that was never requested leaves no trace by itself. Deployments that also capture at a boundary record traffic the agent never reported, and passive telemetry observations give an auditor a second record set to compare the signed receipts against.
The deployment topology
The agent process imports the Asqav SDK and calls the signer over HTTPS with its API key. The signer holds the ML-DSA-65 keys and checks each request before it signs and appends to the hash chain.
The signer keeps the key in Asqav's local encrypted key store, or on Enterprise in an Asqav-managed AWS KMS or GCP KMS (see Key Management).
Asqav operates the signer and its keys. The customer operates the agent and checks each receipt offline against the public verify key.
Calling the signer from the SDK
The Python SDK reaches the signer at https://api.asqav.com/api/v1. The agent holds no signing key, so the trust boundary sits between the agent and Asqav.
Asqav-hosted notary signer
import asqav
asqav.init()
agent = asqav.Agent.create("invoice-bot")
receipt = agent.sign(
"filesystem:write",
{"path": "/exports/q1-invoices.csv", "bytes": 18324},
)
Further reading
- Post-quantum Signed Receipts
- NSA MCP Security Guidance: Asqav Coverage
- SEC 17a-4 standards page
- NYDFS Part 500 standards page
- DORA standards page
- Key Management (KMS backends)
References
- 17 CFR 240.17a-4, eCFR
- Cybersecurity Regulation (23 NYCRR Part 500), New York State Department of Financial Services
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), EUR-Lex
- HIPAA Security Rule (45 CFR Part 164, Subpart C), eCFR
- SOC 2, AICPA
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), EUR-Lex
- Web Authentication (WebAuthn) Level 3, W3C
- FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, NIST